A Reexamination of the War in Kosovo Essay

The Clinton Administration, along with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was not completely effective in both identifying the concrete objectives relating to the Kosovo conflict and applying the military resources that were available to resolve that conflict. There are many reasons for this behind this inefficiency. First, there was the general reluctance to get involved in the conflict, for more or less political reasons. Second, there was the constant infighting and territorial battles being waged within the military structure. Third, there was the heavy need to manage media perception, which was perhaps absent in past wars. Lastly, there was the weakness of the military capability itself, most especially in terms of fighting a war under different weather conditions. The Four Factors The first factor that hampered the efficient execution of the war in Kosovo was the general reluctance of American leaders, both civilian and military, to get involved in the first place. There was a widespread feeling that it was not the time for America to be intervening actively in the affairs of a relatively small and unimportant state in Eastern Europe. After all, what was there to be gained by implementing interventionist policies there? Back then, as now, the focus of many political and military planners was Israel and the Middle East, the hotbed of the world; perpetually in crisis. But there was at least a solid rationale for that preoccupation – the Middle East was by far the largest supplier of oil in the world, and stability there was important to the energy supply and thus the overall growth of the U. S. economy. But what was to be gained in Kosovo, especially since much risk was to be undertaken in terms of the country’s resources, as well as its prestige? American had failed to intervene in Rwanda and had been forced to a humiliating retreat in Somalia, and those bitter memories were still fresh in the minds of most Americans. In the Rwandan genocide, America drew heavy criticism from its allies and the world at large for its inaction; in Somalia, America drew derision for its decision to pull out prematurely. Both the political and military establishments suffered from these events, and they understandably wanted to avoid a similar occurrence from happening again. Getting involved in war in which there seemed so little to gain was anathema to many leaders at the time. The constant infighting within the American military and within NATO was the second factor that hampered the Kosovo operations. General Clark detailed many examples of his daily battles with his civilian superiors, as well as his peers from within the military establishment. These incidents, quite obviously, detracted from the efficiency of the operations themselves. For instance, the example of how the some senior staff generals with political access prevented the effective use of Apache helicopters provides a sickening image of how generals on the ground can be obstructed by those who wield political power. The constant fear that other conflicts might erupt in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula was also an albatross that hung heavily over the collective necks of those involved in the Kosovo war. Allowing these fears to detract from the efficient prosecution of the war could have led to disaster under certain circumstances. The lack of cooperation was not limited to within the American military itself, but in NATO as well. Commanders of other nations were known to disobey Clark’s commands if these orders were interpreted as not being conducive to their respective strategic national interests. Yet, in a way, this was the least of Clark’s problems, for the other allied nations played a lesser role in the conflict in comparison with the U. S. , with the possible exception of Great Britain. It was the problems caused by infighting within the army, as well as disagreements with Washington, that made General Clark’s tenure as SACEUR truly difficult. This perhaps can be attributed to the reality that political objectives and military objectives are rarely one and the same, and the fact that military leaders at the highest levels are rarely apolitical. The greater role played by the media in American wars was also in full-display during the Kosovo conflict. Ever since the Vietnam War, the U. S. had shown a marked distaste for any number of war casualties (This had driven its research into unmanned and â€Å"smart† technologies. ) So much so, in fact, that the enemies of America had long viewed this is as the primary weakness of the nation’s military power. Indeed, this weakness has provided the most basic strategy of terrorist organizations today. They know for a fact that in terms of raw military strength, they are inferior to the United States. Thus, if they ever come under direct attack by the U. S. , their chances of victory are slim. But if they can inflict just enough casualties (usually through guerilla tactics) and have it broadcast over the broadcast media in dramatic fashion, then public opinion might force U. S. forces to withdraw, as was the case in Vietnam. It was under this same hope that Saddam Hussein stood defiant against the United States in the last Iraq War. Lastly, there was the weakness within the military itself, especially in terms of being an all-terrain, all-weather capable fighting force. Many instances within the book and numerous statements made by General Clark point to the fact that the U. S. military is by no means an effective, â€Å"all-weather conditions† army. In fact, it seems as if the attainment of this goal is still a long way off, as has perhaps been underscored more recently by some of the maintenance problems encountered in Iraq. Also, high levels of weapon technology have brought with them their own special set of problems, which could not have been foreseen but nevertheless need to be addressed as soon as possible. These include, among others, the gathering and timely application of intelligence in order to use these weapons to their maximum effect. A lack of cross-understanding between the various military units also contributes to military weakness. In his concluding remarks in Waging Modern War, General Clark says this: In Kosovo my commanders and I found that we lacked the detailed prompt information to campaign effectively against the Serb ground forces. Most of the technologies we had been promoting since the Gulf War were still immature, unable to deal with the vagaries of weather, vegetation, and urban areas, or the limitations of bandwidth and airspace. The discrete service programs didn’t always fit together technically†¦The officers who operated the programs were not qualified to work across service lines and did not understand the full range of national capabilities. I worried about the nature of Joint skills even among senior officers. Of course, notwithstanding these four factors, the war was brought to a successful conclusion – â€Å"successful† meaning that the combat operations against the forces of Slobodan Milosevic proved effective enough to topple the regime of that ruler, and thereby remove the impetus to the racial killings in that region. However, whether or not America achieved its true aims in the Balkans is more open to question, if indeed the Clinton Administration had a clear vision of what those aims were in the first place. The costs of that conflict, both tangible and intangible, must also be analyzed in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future. An Analysis of the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability of the Military Action in Kosovo The concept of feasibility closely ties in to the question â€Å"Can it be done? † With the benefit of hindsight, we might say with complete assurance that yes, the military action undertaken in Kosovo was feasible. However, even without this particular benefit, the question of feasibility still would have been answered in the affirmative. There was perhaps no other military force in the world that could have undertaken the mission in Kosovo, and done so with success. Even before the campaign began, it was almost a forgone conclusion that American forces would prevail. It was only a matter of time, and though unforeseen setbacks would occur along the way, no one truly doubted the ultimate result. Addressing the question of acceptability is a little more complex, but may also be answered in the affirmative. At the time of the conflict, world opinion was crying out for America to do something about the killings under Milosevic. In many ways, the various nations comprising NATO and the U. N. pushed the U. S. into action. Internationally then, military action in Kosovo was acceptable – some might even say it was warranted, due to the role of the U. S. as the global policeman. The war was costly – what war isn’t? – but it gained for the U. S. a level of prestige and credibility that it very much needed after some decidedly embarrassing political problems. The effectiveness of the air campaign and General Clark’s own philosophy of waging war (which de-emphasizes the use of ground troops) resulted in fewer casualties than might otherwise have been expected. This in itself was a potent testimony to American power and a reaffirmation of the high reputation already earned by the American military in the 1991 Gulf War. If the goal in Kosovo was to stop the genocidal killings and bring Slobodan Milosevic to justice, then we can honestly say that military action was suitable. Some pundits may argue that diplomacy would have been a better choice, but they must be reminded that diplomatic methods were tried before any full-scale operations were conducted – and diplomacy failed. With a hard-boiled tyrant such as Milosevic, who deliberately released wave upon wave of racial hate upon his own country, diplomacy could not possibly have a great effect. Even if diplomatic channels could have been used to stop the killings – and this is doubtful – they would have taken far too long to mobilize and would have probably ended up with little to show for it. Conclusion Despite many problems that were unforeseen (and perhaps unavoidable), the military action in Kosovo ended up attaining its major objectives. Still, the operation could have gone better, and more smoothly. In the future, if similar circumstances should come up, both political and military planners would do well to review the lessons learned in this conflict. First, a good amount of political will should be present, and directed at a clear set of pre-defined goals. Second, bickering and infighting within the military should be checked, reduced, and if possible eliminated. Third, all leaders involved in a conflict should be aware of how to manage media perceptions, especially in terms of obtaining continuing public support. Lastly, the capability of the military to wage war under all conditions should be improved and made the top priority of defense spending. When these four factors are improved to their various degrees, then the prosecution of future wars will decidedly become more efficient and effective.